







Catia Batista, Nova School of Business and Economics, Universidade Nova de Lisboa 
David McKenzie, Development Research Group, The World Bank 
 





We use incentivized laboratory experiments to investigate how potential migrants make 
decisions between working in different destinations in order to test the predictions of different 
classic theories of migration. We test theories of income maximization, migrant skill-selection, 
and multi-destination choice and how the predictions and behavior under these theories vary as 
we vary migration costs, liquidity constraints, risk, social benefits, and incomplete information. 
We show how the basic income maximization model of migration with selection on observed 
and unobserved skills leads to a much higher migration rate and more negative skill-selection 
than is obtained when migration decisions take place under more realistic assumptions. Second, 
we find evidence of a home bias, where simply labelling a destination as “home” causes more 
people to choose that location. Thirdly, we investigate whether the independence of irrelevant 
alternatives (IIA) assumption holds. We find it holds for most people when decisions just involve 
wages, costs, and liquidity constraints. However, once we add a risk of unemployment and 
incomplete information, IIA no longer holds for about 20 percent of our sample. 
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Income differences across countries around the world are enormous, so that international 
migration provides the opportunity for those who move to dramatically increase their incomes 
(McKenzie et al. 2010; Clemens et al., forthcoming). Yet only 3.3 percent of the world’s 
population live outside their country of origin.
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 Moreover, those who do migrate are positively 
selected on education from almost every sending country, despite returns to skill being higher in 
many developing countries than in OECD destinations (Grogger and Hanson, 2011). These 
patterns of low levels of migration and positive sorting on skills present a challenge to classic 
theories of migration decisions such as the income maximization approach of Sjaastad (1962) 
and the Roy-model selection approach of Borjas (1987).  
The theoretical literature on migration choice has since evolved from a simple consideration of 
the income gained from moving to the cost of this move to also incorporate liquidity constraints, 
risk and uncertainty, imperfect information, and choices between multiple destinations. Different 
assumptions about how potential migrants trade-off these different factors can then give rise to 
different predictions as to how many individuals will move and to where. Empirically testing 
these theories is however difficult, given that these attributes are not distributed randomly across 
destinations or individuals. 
We use incentivized laboratory experiments to test how potential migrants trade-off different 
location attributes and use this to distinguish between competing migration theories. We work 
with samples in Lisbon and Nairobi to examine how sensitive our results are to the study 
population. We randomly assign observed and unobserved skill levels, and endowments to 
potential migrants, and then have them make choices between destinations with different returns 
to skills. We vary the risk of unemployment, whether or not liquidity constraints bind, whether or 
not there is full information, and the number of destinations. Using the basic Sjaastad/Borjas 
model we would predict extremely high migration rates, with negative self-selection. Adding 
additional real world features like risk, liquidity constraints, and incomplete information 
dramatically lowers migration rates and makes selection less negative. We also document a home 
bias effect, where simply labelling a destination as home without changing the payoffs reduces 
migration to other destinations. Finally, we can directly investigate the independence of 
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irrelevant alternatives (IIA) assumption often made in modelling multi-destination migration 
decisions. We find IIA holds for most people when migration decisions just involve wages, 
costs, and possible liquidity constraints, but starts to break down for some individuals when risk 
and incomplete information are added. In the sample taken in Nairobi, we also find evidence to 
suggest some people make migration decisions based on cost minimization rather than income 
maximization. Taken together, we believe the results demonstrate the need to move beyond 
classic theories in order to explain the patterns we see in global migration. 
This paper contributes to a literature that uses experimental methods to learn about migration 
(McKenzie and Yang, 2012; McKenzie 2015). Almost all of these experiments have involved 
policy experiments which vary migrant access to particular services such as financial education, 
bank accounts, or communication services (e.g. Ashraf et al., 2015; Batista and Narciso, 2018), 
or which attempt to facilitate migration (Bryan et al., 2014; Beam et al., 2016). This paper adds 
to a much more nascent literature that uses lab experiments. The first example comes from Baláž 
et al. (2014), who asked Slovak university students to make non-incentivized choices between 
destinations, to investigate how individuals trade-off economic attributes (wages and living 
costs) against non-economic factors (climate, crime levels, language difficulty, and personal 
freedom), varying whether individuals had full or incomplete information. They find that wages 
and costs are the most important attributes, but that these non-economic factors also matter. 
Barnett-Howell (2017) used a migration video game in a lab experiment to see how individuals 
make choices over destination search, finding a role for imperfect information in explaining lack 
of movement. Lagakos et al. (2017) use discrete choice experiments to examine how 
Bangladeshis trade-off wages, housing conditions, employment, and frequency of family visits. 
They find the quality of housing at destination to be an important determinant of the willingness 
to move internally. This literature complements our findings by highlighting the importance of 
looking beyond a simple comparison of wages and costs for understanding migration. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 discusses our sample and the game 
set-up; Section 3 our key results for testing classic theories in the two destination version of the 





2. Sample and Game Set-up 
The peak age of international emigration from developing countries is between 22 and 24 years 
(McKenzie, 2008), with more educated individuals more likely to emigrate (Grogger and 
Hanson, 2011). We therefore choose for our lab experiments to focus on tertiary educated 
students in their final year of study. This gives us a sample of individuals who are among those 
with the highest likely of making international migration decisions in the near future. Within 
these criteria, we work with samples from two countries: Portugal and Kenya. 
2.1 Lisbon Sample  
The experimental subjects in the Lisbon sample were recruited in April and May 2017, and were 
final-year undergraduate students from the Nova School of Business and Economics. 
Recruitment took place through emails announcing the possibility to participate in a study about 
career prospects. These emails were sent directly by the school administration to all potential 
participants. Students are mostly Portuguese, with just over five percent from Lusophone Africa. 
Nova encourages students to study abroad for a semester in their fourth or fifth semester, and 
half the sample has spent six months or more outside of Portugal. 
Table 1 summarizes some basic characteristics of the 154 students who took part in our lab 
experiments. The sample is 45 percent female, and ranges in age from 19 to 25, with a mean of 
20.7. 58 percent are economics majors. At the time of participating, a few months before 
graduation, 19 percent had received a job offer for a post-graduation job, with 6 percent having a 
job offer outside of Portugal. This is a sample with high interest in migration, with 53 percent 
saying they would prefer to work outside of Portugal after graduation. 
We gave participants a short test of 10 questions designed to measure basic mathematical skills 
(e.g. 37+0.5×64), and 10 questions designed to ensure they were able to calculate expected 
values (e.g   40% chance of winning 100€, 40% chance of winning 50€, 20% chance of winning 
20€). The means were 9.6 and 9.3 out of 10, showing this group is comfortable making 
calculations that might be required in deciding between different destinations when risk is 
involved. 
2.2 Nairobi Sample 
The second sample consists of 265 final year students from Strathmore University and the 
University of Nairobi who took part in lab sessions conducted by the Busara Center in 




studies, statistics and computer science. Nearly all students were born in Kenya, and only twelve 
percent has spent six months or more outside of the country. Table 1 summarizes some basic 
characteristics. As in the Lisbon sample, 45 percent of the Nairobi sample is female. Students 
tend however to be older, with a mean age of 22.7, ranging from 19 to 32. 32 percent are 
economics majors. At the time of participating, 19 percent had received a job offer for a post-
graduation job (exactly the same proportion as in the Lisbon sample), although only 2 percent 
had a job offer outside of Kenya. This is also a sample with a relatively high interest in 
migration, although lower than in the Lisbon sample: 32 percent of subjects in the Nairobi 
sample say they would prefer to work outside of Kenya after graduation. They perform similarly 
to the Lisbon sample on the simple mathematical skills test (mean of 9.6 out of 10), but perform 
considerably worse on the expected values test (mean of 4.0 out of 10).  
2.3 Game Set-up 
Sessions took place in experimental labs, in twenty sessions of between two and thirteen students 
per session in Lisbon, and in 14 sessions ranging from five to thirty-five students in Nairobi. All 
games were programmed in z-tree.  The session began with a short questionnaire to collect basic 
background information about each participant. They then played games on chance and 
probability to measure risk and ambiguity preferences (see Appendix 1). Then the main part of 
the session involved migration decisions. Participants were given the following instructions to 
motivate the choices they would be asked to make in the game: 
We are interested in learning how people make decisions between different places to work. 
Imagine that you have just accepted a job offer from a multinational company which has 
branches around the world. Your employer has told you that you need to accept a company 
transfer to a different country for a year, but is offering you the choice between destinations. 
You should assume that everything else about the job and living conditions will be the same 
across destinations, apart from the information the employer tells you.  
Some of the decisions will be very simple, since the only thing that will vary across the 
destinations will be the wage you are offered and the cost of moving. Others will be more 
complicated, since there will be chances of unemployment, you might not be able to afford 
the moving costs, or you might need to decide whether to pay to get all the information you 




You will start the game with a certain endowment. You can use this money to pay the costs of 
moving, or to acquire information. This is reset for each decision. If we end up playing a 
game for real, any amount left from your endowment that you do not spend will be added to 
your game winnings. 
You should make each decision as seriously as you can, since at the end of the game we will 
randomly choose one of your choices to play for real money (using an exchange rate of 1000 




Each participant was randomly assigned a skill level s uniformly from {1, 2, 3}. This can be 
thought of as education, or observed skill in standard migration models. Then, as in Borjas 
(1987), individuals also have unobserved skills ed that additionally affect how they are paid in 
different migration destinations d. These are randomly drawn from {-200, 0, 200} and are 
assumed to be perfectly positively correlated for the same individual across destinations for most 
versions of the games, with the exception of a variant where they are set to zero, and one where 
they are perfectly negatively correlated. Individuals are also given a random endowment of 
wealth which is drawn as {50, 100}*s. This captures the empirical regularity that more educated 
people tend to also be wealthier on average. 
Games were grouped into three blocks, each of nine games. Block 1 involved making choices 
between two different destinations, Block 2 choices among three different destinations, and 
Block 3 among five different destinations. The ordering of the blocks was randomized, as was 
the ordering and labelling of each destination within each game. Appendix Table 1 confirms that 
the programming successfully randomized the assignment of skill, endowment, unobserved skill, 
and module order. 
In each game, participants must choose which destination to work in based on the wage w 
offered at that destination (which depends in turn on their observed and unobserved skill levels), 
the cost of moving to that destination, the risk of being unemployed, any social insurance paid if 
they are unemployed (which can be broadly understood as including any type of formal or 
informal support individuals receive from their network when unemployed), and whether or not 
their endowment is sufficient to cover the costs of moving. In some of the games there is 
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incomplete information, with participants only being told the distribution of possible 
unemployment and social insurance rates, but having the option to pay to have full information. 
In other variants the risk of unemployment is endogenous, depending on how many other people 
in the same lab session also decide to migrate to a destination. Table 2 describes the key 
parameters of the nine games in the block with just two destinations. We discuss these more in 
detail in the next section. 
2.4 Testing Home Bias 
We designed the games thinking of destination 1 as “home”, and other destinations as migration 
choices. However, we were concerned that the mere labelling of a destination as “home” might 
affect choices, regardless of pay-offs, and so in games 1 through 27 we referred to destinations as 
“destination 1”, “destination 2”, etc., randomizing at the individual level the ordering of which 
destination was labelled with each number in each game. In a final game, we explicitly tested for 
home bias by telling participants “now the multinational corporation allows you to continue 
working in your home country, while also giving an option to move to a destination abroad”. We 
set the cost of moving to be zero, and the monthly wage to be the same in both destinations. If 
labelling a destination as “home” had no effect on decisions, we would expect individuals to be 
invariant between the two destinations, and so choices to be equally split between the two
3
. 
However, we find that 58.4 percent of the Lisbon sample and 63.8 percent of the Nairobi sample 
chose the home destination, which t-tests show to be significantly different from 50 percent 
(p=0.0357 and p<0.0001 respectively).  Moreover, we find choices in this game to be strongly 
correlated with their professed desire to work abroad after graduating in the baseline 
questionnaire: 32.1 percent of those who say they want to work abroad chose the home 
destination, versus 87.7 percent of those who say they want to remain in Portugal (p<0.0001).  
Likewise, 40 percent of those who want to work abroad in the Nairobi sample chose the home 
destination, versus 75 percent of those who say they want to remain in Kenya (p<0.0001). This 
shows the importance of not using the “home” label in our main game choices, but also suggests 
that choices in this last game may be predictive of actual future migration decisions – something 
we plan to test once we collect follow-up data to see whether individuals migrate. 
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3. Testing Classic Theories of Income Maximization and Migrant Self-Selection 
We begin by examining how classic migration theories predict migration behavior in the two 
destination case. For participant i with randomly assigned skill level si, unobserved skill at 
destination 1 of e1i, and unobserved skill at destination 2 of e2i, the wages available at the two 
destinations were specified as: 
𝑤1𝑖 = 500 + 300𝑠𝑖 + 3𝑒1𝑖         (1) 
𝑤2𝑖 = 1000 + 100𝑠𝑖 + 𝑒2𝑖         (2) 
As noted, we consider destination 1 as the home destination. There is thus no cost of moving to 
this destination and the participant always has full information about this destination and no risk 
of unemployment. Destination 2 has a higher base wage rate, but a lower return to both observed 
and unobserved skills. This mirrors the setting in many migrant countries of origin, where the 
returns to skill are greater at home, but base income levels are higher abroad. The cost of moving 
to destination 2 is set to be the same for all participants, and in particular, does not vary with skill 
level. We made clear to participants that this was a one period decision, so that although the 
wage was presented as a monthly wage to make it comparable to their real life framing, the cost 
of moving should also be thought of as a monthly equivalent. We then define migration as the 
decision to choose destination 2 instead of destination 1. 
Participants were not told their s and e, but were instead told their endowment and the costs 
involved, and then presented with wage offers in both destinations. As a result, they did not have 
to calculate the wage they would earn given their observed and unobserved skill levels, but just 
make decisions based on wages and costs. A summary screen also summarized the key 
parameters for the decision (Appendix 2 provides example screenshots). 
3.1 Income Maximization and Migrant Self-Selection 
In the simplest classic theory of migration, individuals make a comparison of the benefits and 
costs of migrating (Sjaastad, 1962). In this view, the driving force behind migration is income 
maximization. In our first three games, this should be the only factor driving decisions, since 
there is full information, no liquidity constraints, and no risk of unemployment.  In Lisbon, out of 
the 462 decisions made across the three games, 446 (96.5 percent) choose the income-
maximizing option. However, more deviations from income maximization occurred in the 
Nairobi sample, where only 610 (76.7 percent) of the 795 decisions made across the three games 




 In game 1, there is no unobserved skill, and the cost of moving is 50 euros.
4
 Theory would then 
predict that all of those with skill levels 1 and 2 should migrate, while none of those with skill 
level 3 should. That is, there should be negative self-selection by skill. The top left panel of 
Figure 1 plots the actual migration rates in the Lisbon sample of 96.5% of those assigned skill 
level 1, 88.6% of those assigned skill level 2, and 1.9 percent of those assigned skill level 3. In 
Nairobi, the rates are 68.1% of those assigned skill level 1, 51.1% of those assigned skill level 2, 
and 10.7% of those assigned skill level 3. Borjas (1987) introduced the importance of also 
considering self-selection on unobserved skills. The remaining games allow for this possibility, 
and equations (1) and (2) show that the return to unobserved skills is also higher at home than at 
destination. In game 2, the unobserved skills are perfectly correlated at home and abroad, while 
in game 3 they are perfectly negatively correlated.
5
 In both cases, the migration predictions are 
the same: the high return to unobserved skills at home should induce those with observed skill 
level 1 or 2 who have high unobserved skills not to migrate, while inducing those with low 
unobserved skills to migrate from skill level 3. This is seen in Figure 2. If we look at the impact 
on self-selection with regard to observed skills, the top middle and top right panels of Figure 1 
show that there is less migration than was the case in game 1, and that it is less negatively 
selected, with maximum migration rates occurring in the middle of the observed skill 
distribution.  
3.2 Why aren’t some people income maximizing? 
Income maximization holds for almost all the Portuguese sample. However, one quarter of the 
decisions made in the first three games for the Nairobi sample do not show income 
maximization. This is particularly notable in Game 1, where 31 percent do not income maximize. 
Faced with this pattern, we randomly chose 41 individuals who had not maximized income in 
one of their choices in our later sessions in Nairobi, and did a qualitative debrief with them to ask 
why. Almost all these participants said that a desire to avoid costs was their reason for their 
choice. For example, one noted “as I am a student you make sure you avoid costs, you don’t 
know what can come from them”. This idea of cost-minimization as the key reason for not 
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 The difference is in where the individuals end up in the destination wage distribution. Game 3 is an example of 
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maximizing income is supported by the data. Out of the 84 individuals who did not maximize 
income in Game 1, 75 of those assigned skill levels 1 and 2 did so by choosing to avoid the 
higher wage destination 2 that involved a moving cost, while only 9 of those assigned skill level 
3 did not maximize income by choosing to pay the cost and go to destination 2, even though 
destination 1 would have maximized income.
6
 Taken together, this qualitative and quantitative 
evidence supports the idea that non-income-maximization was the desired choice, and not simply 
the result of participants making random choices or hitting the wrong button. 
3.3 Introducing Liquidity Constraints and Risk 
There are no liquidity constraints in either Sjaastad (1962) or Borjas (1987), with all those who 
wish to migrate able to do so. We introduce liquidity constraints in Game 4 by increasing the 
cost of moving to 100, and otherwise keeping the game the same as in Game 2. Recall that 
endowments are randomly assigned as {50, 100}*s. Therefore, all of those with skill level 1 that 
receive an endowment of 50 are not able to migrate, even though they would not like to. This 
halves the migration rate of those in the Lisbon sample with skill level 1 from 72% in Game 2 to 
35% in Game 4 (p<0.001); and also halves the rate in the Nairobi sample from 56% in Game 2 to 
27% in Game 4 (p<0.001) The higher cost also lowers the return to migration, so that individuals 
with skill level 2 and unobserved skill 0 are now indifferent between the two destinations. This 
lowers the migration rate in Lisbon of skill level 2 from 70% in Game 2 to 52% in Game 4 
(p=0.019), and in Nairobi from 42% in Game 2 to 30% in Game 4 (p=0.016). In contrast, it 
should not affect the migration decisions of those with skill level 3, and indeed the migration rate 
for them is similar in Game 4 (28%) and Game 2 (32%) in Lisbon (p=0.16), although the rate is 
slightly lower in Game 4 (30%) than in Game 2 (37%) in Nairobi (p=0.057). The overall result is 
that liquidity constraints have lowered migration rates, and made migration less negatively 
selected than the standard Borjas model would predict. 
The Sjaastad and Borjas models also contain no risk of unemployment. Harris and Todaro (1970) 
introduced the risk of unemployment, and model individuals as choosing whether to migrate or 
not on the basis of maximizing expected earnings. In Game 5, we introduce a 30 percent chance 
of unemployment at destination 2, with those who are unemployed receiving unemployment 
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insurance of 200 (this could be thought of as informal insurance from family and network 
members in situations where migrants are not eligible for formal benefits). 92.2 percent of 
participants in Lisbon and 77.0 percent in Nairobi then maximize expected earnings in the 
resulting game. This chance of unemployment lowers the attractiveness of migration relative to 
Game 2, and should make it more negatively selected with respect to both observed and 
unobserved skill. We see this in Figures 1 and 2. In the Lisbon sample, the migration rate has 
fallen from 72% to 35% for skill level 1, from 70% to 25% for skill level 2, and from 32% to 2% 
for skill level 3. Almost all the migration comes from low-skilled individuals with low 
unobserved skills. In Nairobi, the migration rate falls from 56% to 26% for skill level 1, from 
42% to 11% for skill level 2, and from 37% to 13% for skill level 3. 
An alternative way to allow for the risk of unemployment is to make it endogenous. Let N be the 
number of people in the lab session. In game 6, we fixed the number of jobs J available at 
destination 2,
7
 and participants were told that if more than J out of the N people in the lab chose 
to move to destination 2, the jobs would be randomly assigned and the remainder would be 
unemployed. Figure 2 shows this endogenous unemployment setting leads to a similar pattern of 
negative selection on unobserved skill as in Game 5, except in inducing some individuals with 
skill level 3 and the lowest unobserved skill level to migrate. This makes the overall migrant 
selection on skills in Figure 1 less negative than in Game 5.  
We elicit from participants how many people they think will move to destination 2, and use this 
to calculate expected earnings. Only 65.6 percent in Lisbon and 64.9 percent in Nairobi 
maximize expected earnings in this version of the game. In Lisbon, 92 percent of those not 
maximizing expected earnings are choosing not to migrate, even though they expect positive 
gains from doing so; while in Nairobi this is the case for 69 percent of those not maximizing 
expected earnings. 
3.4 Risk Preferences and Risky Migration Decisions 
The “new economics of labor migration” theory notes that once risk is introduced into migration 
decision-making, risk-preferences should also matter (Stark and Bloom, 1985; Rosenzweig and 
Stark, 1989). We take the sub-sample of participants in Games 5 and 6 for whom risk 
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preferences should in theory enter into their migration decisions
8
, and in Table 3 estimate probit 
models to test whether measures of risk preferences help predict which individuals choose to 
migrate. In Lisbon, all three measures of risk-seeking preferences are positively associated with 
migrating in Game 5, with two out of the three significant, as is the first principal component of 
all three measures. In contrast, migration behavior is more difficult to predict in Game 6 (with 
endogenous unemployment), and although the first principal component of the risk preference 
measures is positive, it is smaller in size than for Game 5, and not statistically significant. The 
Dohmen et al. (2011) risk preference measure is significant at the 5 percent level in the Lisbon 
sample, and is the only risk preference measure correlated with behavior in the Nairobi sample. 
75 percent in Lisbon and 84 percent in Nairobi of those who do not migrate in Game 6, even 
though they have positive expected returns from doing so, are risk averse according to the 
Dohmen et al. measure. 
3.5 Introducing Incomplete Information 
All of these different models about migration discussed so far assume that individuals have full 
information when calculated expected returns from migration. However, it is difficult and costly 
to acquire information about destinations abroad, and there is evidence that migrants in different 
contexts can have incorrect information (McKenzie et al, 2013; Shrestha, 2017; Batista and Bah, 
2018). Game 7 introduces this element of incomplete information into migrant decision-making 
by adding uncertainty over the chance of unemployment at destination 2, and over the 
unemployment insurance that would be received in case of unemployment. Participants can then 
pay to acquire information about the actual odds. In particular, they are told that the chance of 
unemployment is either 10%, 30%, or 50%; and that unemployment insurance will either be 100, 
200, or 300. They can either make their migration decision without paying for this information, 
or pay 25 for each piece of information they want and then make their decision. The endowment 
for this game is set at 100*s for everyone, so that all players can pay both the cost of moving and 
the costs of acquiring all available information if they so wish. 
It is not optimal for individuals with unobserved skills of 200, or with unobserved skill 0 and 
skill levels 2 or 3, to pay for information, yet we find 6.6 percent of them in Lisbon do and 42.4 
percent in Nairobi do. In Lisbon, 82.1 percent of the remaining participants pay for some 
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information: 78 percent for the unemployment risk, and 41 percent to learn the amount of 
unemployment insurance. In Nairobi, 55.8 percent pay for some information: 47 percent for the 
unemployment risk and 35 percent to learn the amount of unemployment insurance. We 
measured ambiguity-aversion (see Appendix 1) and test whether this predicts who pays for 
information among the subsample for which paying for information can be optimal. In Lisbon, 
84.1 percent of the ambiguity-averse pay for information, compared to 79.4 percent of those not 
ambiguity-averse, but this difference is not statistically significant (p=0.599). Likewise the 
difference is not statistically significant in Nairobi (57.1 percent for the ambiguity averse 
compared to 54.7 percent for those not ambiguity-averse (p=0.789)). 
The bottom left panel of Figure 1 then shows how the addition of incomplete information 
changes the scale and skill distribution of migrants. In Lisbon, the overall migration rate is 31.8 
percent, compared to only 20.1 percent in Game 5 which had the same expected change of 
unemployment and same expected insurance rate. In Nairobi the overall migration rate rises from 
17.0 percent in Game 5 to 22.7 percent in Game 7. The ability to pay for information allows 
some individuals to find out if they will be lucky and experience a lower chance of 
unemployment or higher benefits, thereby inducing more to migrate. This is particularly 
important for the high-skilled (skill level 3), of whom only 1.9 percent migrated in Game 5 in 
Lisbon, compared to 20.8 percent in Game 7. In Nairobi, it rises from 13.1 percent in Game 5 to 
20.5 percent in Game 7.  This makes migration less negatively selected. 
3.6 Putting it all together 
Games 8 and 9 then combine all the different elements that cause real-life migration decisions to 
deviate from the basic income maximization model of Sjaastad that was played in Game 1. Game 
8 adds the possibility of liquidity constraints to Game 7, by returning the endowment to 
{50,100}*s, so that those with skill level 1 and endowment of 50 cannot afford to purchase 
information if they wish to migrate. This lowers the migration rate from 31.8 percent in Game 7 
to 27.3 percent in Game 8 in Lisbon, and from 22.7 percent in Game 7 in Nairobi to 17.1 percent 
in Game 8, and increases the degree of intermediate skill-selection. 
Game 9 adds the possibility of liquidity constraints to Game 6 (endogenous unemployment), by 
raising the cost of moving to 100 instead of 50. This halves the migration rate from 24.0 percent 




This makes migration less negatively selected. In Nairobi, the fall is more modest, from 27.9 
percent migration in Game 6 to 23.4 percent in Game 9. 
As noted in the introduction, a key puzzle for basic migration theories is why so few people 
migrate, and why migrants are not more strongly negatively selected on skill from many 
countries. Through adding more and more realistic features to our migration decision games, we 
see why. In Lisbon, migration rates for the low-skilled were 97 percent in Game 1, and have 
fallen to 10.5 percent in Game 9, and the resulting skill pattern of migration is much more of an 
intermediate skill-selection. In Nairobi, the migration rate for the low-skilled fell from 68.1 
Percent in Game 1 to 23.1 percent in Game 9. 
4. Testing Multi-Destination Choice 
In practice migrants make choices among multiple possible destinations in many cases. This 
raises two key issues in the literature. The first is how they sort across destinations, as in Dahl’s 
(2002) multidimensional Roy model. Grogger and Hanson (2011) find positive sorting on skill 
within OECD countries, with countries with higher returns to education attracting more educated 
workers on average. The second issue is how the addition of more destinations affects the choice 
between the original two destinations. Many studies in the literature (e.g. Grogger and Hanson, 
2011) have made the independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) assumption. This assumption 
requires that adding a third (or more) destination does not affect the relative odds of choosing 
between the first two destinations. Bertoli and Fernández-Huertas Moraga (2013) question this 
assumption, arguing instead that migration rates between a dyad represented by an origin and a 
destination country do not depend solely on the attractiveness of both, but also on how this 
relates to the opportunities to move to other destinations. We test these ideas in our second and 
third game blocks, by adding additional destinations.  
4.1 Three Destinations 
The second block of games repeats games 1 through 9, with the addition of a third destination.  
Wages at destination 3 are determined by: 
𝑤3𝑖 = 200 + 400𝑠𝑖 + 4𝑒3𝑖         (3) 
We set 𝑒2𝑖 = 𝑒3𝑖 so that unobserved skills are the same in both migrant destinations. Note then 
that this third destination has a higher return to observed and unobserved skills than either 
destination 1 (home) or destination 2, but a lower base wage rate than either. The cost of moving 




Figures 3a and 3b shows the resulting migration choices across the nine games for the Lisbon 
and Nairobi samples respectively. We consider both whether or not the individual chooses to 
migrate at all (blue bars), as well as where they choose to migrate (red and green bars). We see a 
number of similarities with the two destination case: high rates of migration and negative skill-
selection in the basic game, with the migration rates then falling and more intermediate selection 
on observed skills as we add additional real-life features to the migration decision. We see 
positive sorting amongst destinations in the way predicted by basic theory – higher-skilled 
individuals are relatively more likely to migrate to destination 3, which has the highest return to 
skill. Unlike in the case of Game 2 vs Game 3, we do see very different migration patterns in 
Game 11 vs Game 12 in the Lisbon sample. In Game 11, with perfect positive correlation 
between unobserved skill at home and abroad, we see that only those with high observed skill 
level 3 migrate to destination 3. In contrast, in Game 12, the negative correlation between 
unobserved skill at home and abroad combined with the high return to unobserved skill at 
destination 3 leads to more migration to destination 3 from all skill categories. In Game 13, 
adding liquidity constraints to Game 11, migration to the more expensive destination 3 is 
reduced for those with lower skill levels (and hence lower endowments on average). The Nairobi 
sample shows qualitatively similar results, although, as with the two destination version, with 
more deviations from income maximization, which seem to reflect the desire of some individuals 
to minimize costs. 
4.2 Five Destinations 
The third block of games adds destinations 4 and 5 with wages determined by: 
𝑤4𝑖 = 900 + 100𝑠𝑖 + 𝑒4𝑖         (4) 
𝑤5𝑖 = 100 + 400𝑠𝑖 + 4𝑒5𝑖         (5) 
Where the cost of moving to destination 4 is 50, and to destination 5 is 100; and 𝑒2𝑖 = 𝑒3𝑖 =
𝑒4𝑖 = 𝑒5𝑖. Note that destination 4 then costs the same to migrate to as destination 2, and always 
pays a wage of 100 less; and destination 5 costs the same to migrate to as destination 3, and 
always pays a wage of 100 less. The only reason to choose either destination will then be in 
games with a risk of unemployment, if the risk of being unemployed is lower in one of these 
destinations, or the unemployment insurance higher. 
Figures 4a and 4b show the resulting migration choices across the five locations in each of the 




games. The decisions in Games 19 to 22 look similar to those in Games 10 to 13, suggesting that 
the addition of two irrelevant destinations did not change migration choices. We test this 
formally in the next sub-section. In Game 23 the unemployment rate in destination 4 is set at 
20%, which is lower than the 30% in destination 2, so here we do see switching of destinations 
compared to Game 14. In Game 24, we see some strategic choices, where some participants 
choose the lower wage destination 4 instead of 2, believing that less people will move there and 
so the chance of unemployment will be lower. This increases the overall migration rate in the 
Lisbon sample in Game 24 to 38.3 percent, compared to 28.6 percent in Game 15. In Nairobi the 
increase is smaller, from 30.2 percent in Game 15 to 33.2 percent in Game 24. 
In Game 25 there are potentially 8 pieces of information individuals can pay to acquire (the 
unemployment rate and unemployment insurance amount for each of the four destinations). The 
endowment was set to 100*s+200 for this game, so that all participants could afford to purchase 
full information if they wish, and still have enough money left to move to their destination 
choice. However, only 55 percent in Lisbon and 58 percent in Nairobi purchase any information. 
Not a single individual in Lisbon purchases full information: the maximum is 5 pieces of 
information, and the median, conditional on purchasing, is 2 pieces. In contrast, 7.9 percent in 
Nairobi purchase all 8 pieces of information, and the median conditional on purchasing is 3 
pieces of information. The most common piece of information purchased was the unemployment 
rate in destination 2 (46 percent in Lisbon and 35 percent in Nairobi purchased this), followed by 
the unemployment rate in destination 4 (35 percent in Lisbon and 31 percent in Nairobi 
purchased this), with fewer than 2 percent in the Lisbon sample purchasing any information 
about destination 5 (although 23 percent in Nairobi purchased some information about 
destination 5). This shows not all individuals are able to filter out irrelevant choices when 
deciding where to acquire information about migration destinations. 
4.3 Which Features Matter Most for Changing the Level and Skill Selectivity of Migration? 
We stack the migration decisions of individuals across the 27 games and then run a probit to 
investigate which features of the games are most associated with lowering the level of migration 
from the high rates seen in Game 1, and for changing the skill selectivity. Table 4 reports the 
results. We see qualitatively similar results across the two samples, although some of the 
magnitudes are larger in the Lisbon sample given that the Nairobi sample was migrating less to 




The feature that reduces migration levels most is adding either an exogenous or endogenous risk 
of unemployment in the migration destination. This lowers the migration rate by more than 40 
percentage points for the Lisbon sample, and by 19 (endogenous risk) to 26 (exogeneous risk) 
percentage points in the Nairobi sample. Liquidity constraints lower migration rates by 6 to 10 
percentage points, and migration rates decrease with observed and unobserved skill levels in our 
game, reflecting the higher returns to skill at home than abroad. Notably both the risk of 
unemployment and liquidity constraints lower migration more for the low-skilled than for high-
skilled individuals, making migration less negatively skill-selected. 
In contrast, we see migration rates are higher when there are more destinations to choose 
amongst. Incomplete information acts to increase the migration rate in the Lisbon sample, 
because individuals have the opportunity to pay the costs of overcoming this lack of information 
and discovering that the odds of unemployment are lower than the 30 percent average rate 
specified in our complete information setting.  
4.4 Testing IIA 
Independence of irrelevant alternatives requires that if destination 2 is preferred over destination 
1 in the two-destination game, then introducing additional destination choice 3 (or choices 3, 4 
and 5) should not make destination 1 preferable to destination 2. We examine whether IIA holds 
in Figure 5, plotting the proportion of individuals choosing to migrate to destination 2 in each 
game out of all those choosing either destination 1 or destination 2; and in Table 5, which 
summarizes the proportion of individuals who change their relative ranking of destination 1 
versus destination 2 when more destinations are added. 
We see from the top row of Figure 5 and from the first three columns of Table 5 that IIA holds 
for almost everyone in the basic Sjaastad and Borjas games in the Lisbon sample: 95 to 99 
percent of participants do not change their migration decision between destinations 1 and 2 when 
a third, or a third, fourth, and fifth, destination is added. Adding liquidity constraints and an 
exogenous risk of unemployment still results in IIA holding for 90 to 95 percent of participants 
in variants of Games 4 and 5 in Lisbon. In contrast, we see 12 to 22 percent of participants 
violating IIA in these simple settings in the Nairobi sample.  These violations of IIA are linked to 
individuals being inconsistent in choosing cost minimization over income maximization.   
IIA starts to break down for some people in Lisbon under two of our settings. The first is when 




possibility that others who would have migrated to destination 2 now migrate to destination 3, 4, 
or 5, thereby reducing the risk of unemployment at destination 2. This results in 12-14 percent of 
participants changing their ranking of destination 1 versus destination 2 in Games 15 and 24 
versus Game 6, and in Game 24 versus Game 15. 17-18 percent of participants in Nairobi also 
change their ranking here, but this is no higher than it was in the simpler games. The second 
factor is the addition of incomplete information. We see approximately 20 percent of participants 
in Lisbon changing their choice of destination 1 versus destination 2 when more destinations are 
added to Games 7 and 8. One reason for this is that the addition of more destinations with 
incomplete information causes individuals to change whether or not they decide to pay to acquire 
information about destination 2: 19 percent of individuals made a different choice as to whether 
to pay to know what the unemployment rate was in destination 2 when they faced a choice of 
five destinations versus two destinations. In Nairobi, 16-22 percent of participants change their 
rankings in these games with incomplete information. 
We investigate what predicts violation of IIA by estimating probits where the outcome is coded 
as one if the destination choice between destinations 1 and 2 switches in either the 3- or 5-
destination version of the game compared to the 2-destination version, and zero if it stays the 
same. We stack the data to form a panel of choices for each individual, and then cluster standard 
errors at the individual level. Column 1 of Table 6 then shows that the probability of IIA being 
violated in Lisbon does not significantly increase when we add liquidity constraints to the basic 
game, but does when we add risk (either endogenous or exogenous), and incomplete information. 
Column 2 then controls for the assigned skill and unobserved skill levels of the participant. Since 
the return to skill is higher at destination 1 than destination 2, those with higher skill levels are 
less likely to want to migrate at all, so less likely to violate IIA by choosing migration in at least 
one game. Column 3 adds non-game attributes of the individual: we see that violation of IIA is 
not correlated with gender, desire to migrate, ambiguity aversion or risk preferences. Finally, 
column 4 restricts to skill levels 1 and 2, who have the most incentives to migrate, with results 
similar for this sample, except for weakly significant evidence that ambiguity-averse individuals 
are more likely to violate IIA. 
Columns 5 to 8 repeat the same analysis for the Nairobi sample. Here we see that introducing 
liquidity constraints in the game does reduce violations of IIA. This occurs because it physically 




to change this decision when an additional (irrelevant) destination is added. This differs from the 
Lisbon case because there were so few violations of IIA in the basic game in Lisbon for liquidity 
to effect. In contrast to Lisbon, adding exogenous risk reduces violations of IIA in Nairobi. The 
reason here seems less about the complexity of the decision being made, but rather than adding 
exogenous risk made migration less appealing, so that people would be more strongly attached to 
destination 1. We do again see that adding incomplete information leads to more violations of 
IIA. We do not find any correlation between violations of IIA and non-game attributes of the 
individual. In particular, we noted that one difference between the two samples was much worse 
performance on expected value questions in Nairobi. However, it is not the case that those who 
are better at such calculations are less likely to violate IIA. 
 
5. Conclusions 
The preliminary results suggest the promise of laboratory experiments to help us better 
understand migration-decision making behavior. We have four key results: 
1) Adding real world features which take account of liquidity constraints, risk and 
uncertainty, and incomplete information to the Sjaastad/Borjas model makes a huge 
difference in terms of predicting the rate of migration and the selection pattern. The 
largest impact comes from adding risk (of unemployment) to the migration outcome. 
2) Simply labelling a destination as “home” makes individuals more likely to choose it, 
holding wages and costs constant. This is particularly the case for individuals who say 
they are not interested in migrating. In principle this might be used in follow-up games to 
back out the value individuals place on home, and as a predictor of whether individuals 
will migrate in real life. 
3) The independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) assumption which underlies many 
models of multi-destination migration choices holds well for simple migration decisions 
that just involve comparisons of costs and wages in a developed country setting, but even 
in these simple cases, violations occur for 14-21 percent of our sample in Nairobi. 
Moreover, when the risk of unemployment and incomplete information are added, IIA no 




4) Even in the simplest settings, people do not always make the destination choice which 
maximizes net income. Instead, cost minimization seems to be a key decision factor in 
the migration decision for individuals in the Nairobi sample. 
In addition to improving our understanding of the factors affecting migration decisions, these 
results also shed light on why observed migration is lower than could be expected. The 
implications are important for the design of migration policies: they highlight that it cannot be 
simplistically assumed that physical or legal barriers to migration are the only impediments to 
migration, and more comprehensive approaches are required to influence migration behavior. 
 
This is ongoing work. Follow-up surveys of the participants will help determine whether 
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Figure 1:  Rate of Migration and Migration Skill-Selection in Two Destination Games in 
Lisbon Sample (Blue) and Nairobi Sample (Red) 
 
 
Notes:  the return to observed and unobserved skills are held constant across the nine games. Game 1 is the basic 
Sjaastad (1962) migration decision; positively correlated (Game 2) and negatively correlated  (Game 3) unobserved 
skills at home and abroad are introduced in Games 2 and 3 as in Borjas (1987); Game 4 incorporates the possibility 
of liquidity constraints; Game 5  introduces the chance of unemployment at the migration destination; Game 6    
includes endogenous unemployment which depends on how many others move; Game 7  has the risk of 
unemployment with incomplete information  about this risk , but the possibility of paying to know what the risk is; 
Game 8  adds the possibility of liquidity constraints to Game 7; and Game 9 adds the possibility of liquidity 
























































































































































































Figure 2: Borjas Selection on Unobserved Skills with and without Unemployment Risk 
Panel A: Lisbon Sample 
 
Panel B: Nairobi Sample 
 
Notes: Unobserved skill at home and abroad is perfectly positively correlated, and is randomly assigned at the 
individual level as one of -200, 0, or 200. Game 2 is a basic migration decision between two destinations with 
positively correlated unobserved skills at home and abroad as in Borjas (1987). The return to both observed and 
unobserved skills is higher at home than abroad. Game 5 introduces a 30% chance of unemployment at the migrant 
destination, with social benefit 200, compared to Game 2 where there is no unemployment. Game 6 makes the 










































































































































Figure 3a: Rate of Migration and Migration Skill-Selection in Three Destination Games  
in Lisbon Sample 
 
Notes: Games are similar to those in Games 1 to 9, with the addition of a third destination (destination 3), that has a 
lower base wage, but higher return to observed and unobserved skills than migrant destination 2. The return to 
observed and unobserved skills are held constant across the nine games. Game 10 is the basic Sjaastad (1962) 
migration decision; positively correlated (Game 11) and negatively correlated  (Game 12) unobserved skills at home 
and abroad are introduced in Games 11 and 12 as in Borjas (1987); Game 13 incorporates the possibility of liquidity 
constraints; Game 14  introduces a known chance of unemployment at the migration destination, which is randomly 
drawn from {10%, 30%, 50%} for each player for each destination; Game 15  includes endogenous unemployment 
which depends on how many others move to each destination; Game 16  has the risk of unemployment with 
incomplete information about this risk, but the possibility of paying to know what the risk is; Game 17  adds the 
possibility of liquidity constraints to Game 16; and Game 18 adds the possibility of liquidity constraints to Game  15 







Figure 3b: Rate of Migration and Migration Skill-Selection in Three Destination Games  
in Nairobi Sample 
 
Notes: Games are similar to those in Games 1 to 9, with the addition of a third destination (destination 3), that has a 
lower base wage, but higher return to observed and unobserved skills than migrant destination 2. The return to 
observed and unobserved skills are held constant across the nine games. Game 10 is the basic Sjaastad (1962) 
migration decision; positively correlated (Game 11) and negatively correlated  (Game 12) unobserved skills at home 
and abroad are introduced in Games 11 and 12 as in Borjas (1987); Game 13 incorporates the possibility of liquidity 
constraints; Game 14  introduces a known chance of unemployment at the migration destination, which is randomly 
drawn from {10%, 30%, 50%} for each player for each destination; Game 15  includes endogenous unemployment 
which depends on how many others move to each destination; Game 16  has the risk of unemployment with 
incomplete information about this risk, but the possibility of paying to know what the risk is; Game 17  adds the 
possibility of liquidity constraints to Game 16; and Game 18 adds the possibility of liquidity constraints to Game  15 







Figure 4a: Rate of Migration and Migration Skill-Selection in Five Destination Games 
in Lisbon Sample 
 
Notes: Games are similar to those in Games 10 to 18, with the addition of destination 4 (that pays less than 
destination 2), and destination 5 (which pays less than destination 3). The return to observed and unobserved skills 
are held constant across the nine games. Game 19 is the basic Sjaastad (1962) migration decision; positively 
correlated (Game 20) and negatively correlated  (Game 21) unobserved skills at home and abroad are introduced in 
Games 20 and 21 as in Borjas (1987); Game 22 incorporates the possibility of liquidity constraints; Game 23  
introduces a known chance of unemployment at the migration destination, which is 30% at destination 2, 20% at 
destinations 3 and 4, and 10% at destination 5; Game 24  includes endogenous unemployment which depends on 
how many others move to each destination; Game 25  has the risk of unemployment (randomly drawn from {10%, 
30%, 50%} for each player at each destination) with incomplete information about this risk, but the possibility of 
paying to know what the risk is; Game 26  adds the possibility of liquidity constraints to Game 25; and Game 27 
adds the possibility of liquidity constraints to Game  24 and incomplete information about unemployment insurance 





Figure 4b: Rate of Migration and Migration Skill-Selection in Five Destination Games 
in Nairobi Sample 
 
Notes: Games are similar to those in Games 10 to 18, with the addition of destination 4 (that pays less than 
destination 2), and destination 5 (which pays less than destination 3). The return to observed and unobserved skills 
are held constant across the nine games. Game 19 is the basic Sjaastad (1962) migration decision; positively 
correlated (Game 20) and negatively correlated  (Game 21) unobserved skills at home and abroad are introduced in 
Games 20 and 21 as in Borjas (1987); Game 22 incorporates the possibility of liquidity constraints; Game 23  
introduces a known chance of unemployment at the migration destination, which is 30% at destination 2, 20% at 
destinations 3 and 4, and 10% at destination 5; Game 24  includes endogenous unemployment which depends on 
how many others move to each destination; Game 25  has the risk of unemployment (randomly drawn from {10%, 
30%, 50%} for each player at each destination) with incomplete information about this risk, but the possibility of 
paying to know what the risk is; Game 26  adds the possibility of liquidity constraints to Game 25; and Game 27 
adds the possibility of liquidity constraints to Game  24 and incomplete information about unemployment insurance 





Figure 5a: Testing IIA in the Lisbon Sample: Proportion of those Choosing Either 
Destination 1 or 2 Who Choose to Migrate to Destination 2 by Game  
 
Notes: Sample restricted to those answering destination 1 or 2 for each of the three destination choices in a game 
variant. Under IIA proportion migrating to 1 versus 2 should be the same regardless of how many destinations are in 
the Game. Games 1, 10, and 19 are the basic Sjaastad (1962) income maximization decision; Games 2, 11, and 20 
are the Borjas (1987) selection game with positively correlated unobserved skills; Games 3, 12, and 21 are the 
Borjas selection game with unobserved skills in destination 1 negatively correlated with those in other destinations; 
Games 13, and 22 add the possibility of liquidity constraints (Game 4 is omitted because the moving cost was set 
higher in this game); Games 5, 14, and 23 add an exogenous risk of unemployment at destination 2; Games 6, 15, 
and 24 add an endogenous risk of unemployment at destination 3; Games 7, 16, and 25 have an uncertain risk of 
unemployment at destination 2 that individuals can pay to find out; Games 8, 17, and 26 add the possibility of 
liquidity constraints along with uncertainty; and Games 9, 18, and 27 add the possibility of liquidity constraints to 








Figure 5b: Testing IIA in the Nairobi Sample: Proportion of those Choosing Either 
Destination 1 or 2 Who Choose to Migrate to Destination 2 by Game  
 
Notes: Sample restricted to those answering destination 1 or 2 for each of the three destination choices in a game 
variant. Under IIA proportion migrating to 1 versus 2 should be the same regardless of how many destinations are in 
the Game. Games 1, 10, and 19 are the basic Sjaastad (1962) income maximization decision; Games 2, 11, and 20 
are the Borjas (1987) selection game with positively correlated unobserved skills; Games 3, 12, and 21 are the 
Borjas selection game with unobserved skills in destination 1 negatively correlated with those in other destinations; 
Games 13, and 22 add the possibility of liquidity constraints (Game 4 is omitted because the moving cost was set 
higher in this game); Games 5, 14, and 23 add an exogenous risk of unemployment at destination 2; Games 6, 15, 
and 24 add an endogenous risk of unemployment at destination 3; Games 7, 16, and 25 have an uncertain risk of 
unemployment at destination 2 that individuals can pay to find out; Games 8, 17, and 26 add the possibility of 
liquidity constraints along with uncertainty; and Games 9, 18, and 27 add the possibility of liquidity constraints to 







Table 1: Sample Characteristics for Lisbon and Nairobi Samples
Mean S.D. Min. Median Max. Mean S.D. Min. Median Max.
Female 0.45 0.50 0 0 1 0.45 0.50 0 0 1
Age 20.7 1.0 19 20 25 22.7 1.7 20 22 32
Economics Major 0.58 0.49 0 1 1 0.32 0.47 0 0 1
Grade Point Average 15.0 1.4 11 15 18 67.9 9.3 49 67 100
Born abroad 0.06 0.25 0 0 1 0.01 0.09 0 0 1
Spent 6 months or more outside of country 0.52 0.50 0 1 1 0.12 0.32 0 0 1
Would prefer to work outside of country after graduating 0.53 0.50 0 1 1 0.32 0.47 0 0 1
Has a job offer 0.19 0.40 0 0 1 0.19 0.39 0 0 1
Has a job offer outside of country 0.06 0.24 0 0 1 0.02 0.15 0 0 1
Money available as moving costs (Euros/Ksh) 2467 3002 0 1500 20000 182497 253662 0 100000 2000000
Math score (out of 10) 9.55 0.64 7 10 10 9.62 0.73 6 10 10
Expected value question score (out of 10) 9.31 1.51 1 10 10 4.00 4.23 0 2 10
Ambiguity Averse 0.49 0.50 0 0 1 0.49 0.50 0 0 1
Share of a Windfall that would put in a fair gamble 0.30 0.29 0 0.2 1 0.32 0.29 0 0.2 1
Risk-seeking Choice in Eckel and Grossman (2002) risk game 4.10 1.94 1 4 7 3.00 1.82 1 3 7
Point at which switch in Dohmen et al. (2011) risk game 10.19 6.06 1 11 20 7.25 7.35 1 2 21
Sample Size 154 265





Table 2: Migration Decision Factors in Each Game
Correlation in Liquidity Chance of Unemployment Full Cost of 
Game   Wage at Destination Moving Cost Endowment Unobserved skill Constraints Unemployment Insurance Information Information
Game 1 {50,100}*Skill none no no none yes n.a.
Destination 1 500 +300*Skill 0
Destination 2 1000+100*Skill 50
Game 2 {50,100}*Skill perfect positive no no none yes n.a.
Destination 1 500 +300*Skill+3*e1 0
Destination 2 1000+100*Skill+e2 50
Game 3 {50,100}*Skill perfect negative no no none yes n.a.
Destination 1 500 +300*Skill+3*e1 0
Destination 2 1000+100*Skill+e2 50
Game 4 {50,100}*Skill perfect positive yes no none yes n.a.
Destination 1 500 +300*Skill+3*e1 0
Destination 2 1000+100*Skill+e2 100
Game 5 {50,100}*Skill perfect positive no yes yes yes n.a.
Destination 1 500 +300*Skill+3*e1 0 0 0
Destination 2 1000+100*Skill+e2 50 30% 200
Game 6 {50,100}*Skill perfect positive no yes yes no n.a.
Destination 1 500 +300*Skill+3*e1 0 0 0
Destination 2 1000+100*Skill+e2 50 Endogeneous 200
Game 7 100*Skill perfect positive no yes yes no 25
Destination 1 500 +300*Skill+3*e1 0 0 0
Destination 2 1000+100*Skill+e2 50 {10%, 30%, 50%} {100, 200, 300}
Game 8 {50,100}*Skill perfect positive yes yes yes no 25
Destination 1 500 +300*Skill+3*e1 0 0 0
Destination 2 1000+100*Skill+e2 50 {10%, 30%, 50%} {100, 200, 300}
Game 9 {50,100}*Skill perfect positive yes yes yes no n.a.
Destination 1 500 +300*Skill+3*e1 0 0 0
Destination 2 1000+100*Skill+e2 100 Endogeneous 200
Notes: {} denotes parameter is randomly drawn from parameters in set. Skill level is randomly assigned to be 1, 2, or 3. Unobserved skill e1 and e2 are randomly
assigned to be either -200, 0, or 200, with perfect positive correlation in games 2, 4-9, and perfect negative correlation in game 3. Endogenous unemployment
arises when odds of unemployment depend on decisions of others in the session as to whether or not to move to destination 2. Liquidity-constrained games
are ones in which some participants cannot afford the cost of moving to destination 2 and/or of acquiring information about chance of unemployment and 
unemployment insurance offered. In games 7 and 8, participants can elect to pay 25 to learn which of the three possible values of unemployment applies, and




Table 3: Risk Preferences Predict Migration Choices in Games 5 and 6
Panel A: Lisbon Sample
Expected income gain from migrating 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Eckel and Grossman (2002)  risk score 0.047** -0.008
(0.021) (0.028)
Modified Gneezy and Potters (1997) risk score 0.138 -0.048
(0.145) (0.175)
Dohmen et al. (2011) risk score 0.022** 0.019**
(0.009) (0.009)
Principal component of risk-seeking behavior 0.096*** 0.028
(0.032) (0.044)
Sample Size 93 93 93 93 93 93 93 93
Panel B: Nairobi Sample
Expected income gain from migrating 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Eckel and Grossman (2002)  risk score -0.000 0.002
(0.018) (0.021)
Modified Gneezy and Potters (1997) risk score -0.076 -0.158
(0.120) (0.148)
Dohmen et al. (2011) risk score 0.008* 0.010*
(0.004) (0.005)
Principal component of risk-seeking behavior 0.046 0.063
(0.031) (0.040)
Sample Size 147 147 147 147 147 147 147 147
Notes: margin effects from probit estimation shown, with robust standard errors in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote significance
at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels respectively.
All three risk measures are coded so that higher scores indicate more risk-seeking behavior. Principal component also has higher
scores denote more risk-seeking behavior.
Games 5 and 6 involve 2-destination migration choice, where there is a risk of unemployment if migration occurs.
Sample in each case are individuals for whom theory predicts risk preferences should enter into migration decisions.




Table 4: What predicts the level and skill selectivity of migration?
Dependent variable: Choosing a destination other than Destination 1
Full Full Low Medium High Full Full Low Medium High 
Sample Sample Skilled Skilled Skilled Sample Sample Skilled Skilled Skilled
Game Characteristics
Liquidity Constraints -0.096*** -0.096*** -0.277*** -0.111*** 0.031 -0.064*** -0.065*** -0.160*** -0.077*** 0.033*
(0.020) (0.020) (0.042) (0.038) (0.022) (0.012) (0.012) (0.019) (0.018) (0.019)
Exogenous Risk -0.410*** -0.411*** -0.579*** -0.664*** -0.156*** -0.261*** -0.262*** -0.274*** -0.316*** -0.196***
(0.032) (0.032) (0.064) (0.068) (0.034) (0.020) (0.020) (0.039) (0.037) (0.031)
Endogenous Risk -0.413*** -0.413*** -0.566*** -0.652*** -0.169*** -0.187*** -0.187*** -0.211*** -0.216*** -0.132***
(0.025) (0.025) (0.053) (0.048) (0.031) (0.017) (0.017) (0.033) (0.030) (0.026)
Incomplete Information 0.088*** 0.088*** 0.168*** 0.024 0.063 0.022 0.022 -0.004 0.022 0.054*
(0.032) (0.032) (0.051) (0.043) (0.047) (0.018) (0.018) (0.030) (0.034) (0.032)
Observed Skill Level -0.231*** -0.226*** -0.084*** -0.087***
(0.024) (0.025) (0.020) (0.020)
Unobserved Skill Level -0.211*** -0.211*** -0.288*** -0.306*** -0.096*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001***
(0.014) (0.014) (0.025) (0.035) (0.014) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Asset Endowed -0.000 -0.001 -0.001 0.002 -0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Three Destinations 0.155*** 0.155*** 0.170*** 0.119*** 0.144*** 0.075*** 0.075*** 0.125*** 0.066*** 0.034
(0.020) (0.020) (0.037) (0.045) (0.030) (0.014) (0.014) (0.027) (0.021) (0.025)
Five Destinations 0.180*** 0.180*** 0.256*** 0.117*** 0.139*** 0.078*** 0.078*** 0.081*** 0.085*** 0.067**




Wants to work abroad -0.027 0.009
(0.037) (0.034)
Expected value score -0.004 0.001
(0.009) (0.004)
Averse to Ambiguity 0.024 -0.028
(0.038) (0.031)
Dohmen Risk Measure 0.000 0.007
(0.010) (0.009)
Sample Size 4158 4158 1539 1188 1431 7151 7151 2454 2430 2267
Marginal effects from probit estimation shown. Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the individual level. 
*, **, and *** denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels respectively.





Table 5: Proportion Not Obeying IIA by Game
Panel A: Lisbon Sample
Panel I:
Game 1 Game 2 Game 3 Game 4 Game 5 Game 6 Game 7 Game 8 Game 9
Three Destination Version
   Proportion Changing Migration Decision 0.052 0.035 0.010 0.091 0.138 0.220 0.212 0.163
   Sample Size 154 141 105 33 152 150 151 153
Five Destination Version
   Proportion Changing Migration Decision 0.060 0.043 0.019 0.051 0.122 0.167 0.225 0.152
   Sample Size 151 138 103 117 131 138 142 145
Panel II:
Game 10 Game 11 Game 12 Game 13 Game 14 Game 15 Game 16 Game 17 Game 18
Five Destination Version
   Proportion Changing Migration Decision 0.040 0.053 0.066 0.099 0.000 0.119 0.203 0.236 0.138
   Sample Size 151 151 151 152 28 135 143 144 145
Panel B: Nairobi Sample
Panel I:
Game 1 Game 2 Game 3 Game 4 Game 5 Game 6 Game 7 Game 8 Game 9
Three Destination Version
   Proportion Changing Migration Decision 0.160 0.188 0.142 0.157 0.173 0.223 0.160 0.219
   Sample Size 256 234 211 83 248 251 257 247
Five Destination Version
   Proportion Changing Migration Decision 0.198 0.157 0.158 0.119 0.175 0.183 0.160 0.180
   Sample Size 247 217 202 219 228 230 244 239
Panel II:
Game 10 Game 11 Game 12 Game 13 Game 14 Game 15 Game 16 Game 17 Game 18
Five Destination Version
   Proportion Changing Migration Decision 0.213 0.211 0.206 0.271 0.137 0.179 0.210 0.163 0.187
   Sample Size 254 251 252 251 73 246 243 252 246
Notes: 
Sample Size shows number who choose either destination 1 or destination 2 in the three or five destination version of the game.
Game 4 is omitted since the moving cost varied in this Game. Sample for Game 5 versus three destination version Game 14 is restricted
to those for whom chance of unemployment in Game 14 was drawn to be 30%, the same as Game 5. 
Under independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA), choice of destination 1 vs destination 2 should not be affected by addition of more
destinations, and so proportion changing decision should be zero (conditional on choosing either destination 1 or destination 2).
Panel B considers whether choice between destinations 1, 2, and 3 in three destination game is affected by adding destinations 4 and 5.
Compared to Migration Choice in Two Destination Game
Compared to Migration Choice in Three Destination Game
Compared to Migration Choice in Two Destination Game




Table 6: What predicts violation of IIA?
Outcome: Violates IIA
Game Attributes (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Liquidity constraints possible -0.002 0.000 0.001 0.008 -0.043* -0.043* -0.044* -0.047*
(0.020) (0.017) (0.017) (0.022) (0.022) (0.023) (0.023) (0.028)
Exogenous risk 0.103*** 0.090*** 0.090*** 0.118*** -0.038* -0.043* -0.043* -0.070**
(0.033) (0.030) (0.030) (0.041) (0.023) (0.023) (0.022) (0.028)
Endogenous risk 0.102*** 0.082*** 0.082*** 0.117*** 0.004 -0.001 -0.001 -0.008
(0.035) (0.031) (0.031) (0.042) (0.023) (0.022) (0.022) (0.026)
Incomplete Information 0.067*** 0.047** 0.046** 0.050** 0.075*** 0.074*** 0.075*** 0.085**
(0.024) (0.022) (0.021) (0.025) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.034)
Observed Skill Level -0.027*** -0.027*** -0.028 -0.014 -0.015 -0.029
(0.009) (0.010) (0.020) (0.013) (0.014) (0.024)
Unobserved Skill Level (in 100s) -0.047*** -0.046*** -0.045*** -0.029*** -0.028*** -0.030***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007)
Non-game Attributes
Female -0.000 -0.001 -0.011 -0.024
(0.016) (0.021) (0.022) (0.025)
Wants to work abroad after graduating -0.001 0.008 0.020 0.040
(0.017) (0.021) (0.023) (0.027)
Number of expected value questions correct out of 10 -0.003 -0.006 -0.000 -0.002
(0.004) (0.006) (0.002) (0.002)
Averse to Ambiguity 0.023 0.032* -0.010 -0.030
(0.016) (0.019) (0.021) (0.023)
Risk-seeking first principal component -0.006 0.001 0.001 -0.002
(0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.007)
Sample restriction none none none skill 1 and 2 none none none skill 1 and 2
Sample Size 2104 2104 2104 1388 3613 3613 3613 2527
Notes:
Marginal effects from probit estimation shown. Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the individual level. 
Outcome is whether choice in 3 or 5 destination game violates independence of irrelevant alternatives compared to choice over 2 destinations.
Sample restricted to those choosing either destination 1 or 2 in the 3 and 5 destination games.
*, **, and *** denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels respectively.





Appendix 1: Measurement of Preferences 
Modified Gneezy and Potters (1997) task (not incentivized) 
Participants are asked to imagine they won €100,000 in a lottery, and then told there is an 
opportunity for an investment in which there is a 50% chance the money will double 
immediately, and a 50% chance that all the money invested will be lost. They then have to 
decide what amount to invest. Note that in the original Gneezy and Potters task, the gamble has 
positive expected value and so both a risk neutral and risk-seeker should invest the entire 
amount. We modify the task so that the gamble is a fair one, enabling for more gradation in risk 
attitudes. We then calculate the share of the windfall they are willing to gamble, with higher 
shares representing more risk-seeking behavior. 
Eckel and Grossman (2002) task (incentivized) 
Participants are presented with seven gambles, each with 50/50 odds of either outcome, starting 
from a safe alternative (100 game euros for a head or tail), to higher expected return but risky 
gambles (up to 0 for heads, 400 game euros for tails). This is coded from one to seven, with 
higher scores representing more risk-seeking behavior. 
Dohmen et al. (2011) task (incentivized) 
Participants are presented with a series of choices between a lottery that has a 50 percent chance 
of paying 300 game euros and a 50 percent chance of zero versus a safe payment. The safe 
payment varies from 0 to 190 game euros over 20 choices.  We look at the point at which they 
switch from the risky lottery to the safe payment, with a higher number indicating more risk-
seeking behavior. 
Ambiguity Aversion 
Participants are told they will play a game where they draw a ball out of a bag without looking, 
and if it is the right color they win. Bag 1 contains 4 red balls and 6 yellow balls, and if they 
choose this bag, they must   draw a red ball to win. Bag 2 contains 10 balls, some yellow and 
some red. They get to decide which color ball wins, and then must choose this color. Individuals 





Appendix Table 1: Tests of Random Assignment in Lisbon and Nairobi Samples
Unobserved Block Unobserved Block
Skill Endowment Skill Order Skill Endowment Skill Order
Female 0.811 0.141 0.275 0.022 0.042 0.974 0.512 0.380
Age 0.124 0.349 0.983 0.755 0.000 0.981 0.603 0.307
Economics Major 0.739 0.959 0.407 0.114 0.573 0.636 0.452 0.786
Grade Point Average 0.024 0.495 0.718 0.364 0.029 0.690 0.379 0.952
Born outside of Portugal 0.685 0.676 0.218 0.645 0.369 0.979 0.369 0.369
Spent 6 months or more outside of country 0.420 0.219 0.165 0.388 0.656 0.763 0.925 0.255
Would prefer to work outside of country after graduating 0.045 0.223 0.419 0.230 0.051 0.098 0.860 0.876
Has a job offer 0.981 0.983 0.460 0.070 0.526 0.761 0.392 0.565
Has a job offer outside of country 0.455 0.027 0.926 0.624 0.548 0.435 0.635 0.502
Money available as moving costs (Euros/KSh.) 0.981 0.985 0.173 0.606 0.413 0.423 0.274 0.299
Math score (out of 10) 0.119 0.890 0.806 0.781 0.427 0.311 0.190 0.668
Expected value question score (out of 10) 0.606 0.534 0.128 0.991 0.779 0.862 0.436 0.232
Ambiguity Averse 0.285 0.763 0.575 0.975 0.378 0.586 0.572 0.930
Share of a Windfall that would put in a fair gamble 0.380 0.957 0.907 0.502 0.647 0.653 0.565 0.286
Risk-seeking Choice in Eckel and Grossman (2002) risk game 0.559 0.123 0.955 0.334 0.197 0.418 0.256 0.879
Point at which switch in Dohmen et al. (2011) risk game 0.819 0.865 0.681 0.796 0.791 0.073 0.435 0.162
Note: each cell shows the p-value for testing that the variable listed in the first row (e.g. female) is orthogonal to the randomly assigned levels of the column.




Appendix 2: Example Screenshots Showing Decision to be Made 
Game 1 
 
 
 
41 
 
Game 17 
 
 
